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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the primary instruments interest groups use to influence policy is the lobbying of 
legislators.  Lobbying is the direct and private transfer of information to politicians in the 
legislature.  In this sense, lobbying is meant to include reports, arguments, messages, and 
information that interest groups provide directly and privately to legislators and their staffs.  It 
excludes campaign contributions made to a legislators, public advertising, and grassroots 
organization of employees or members. Given the importance of lobbying to policy outcomes, 
groups must decide not only how much effort to exert in the lobbying process, but they must also 
decide when to lobby to influence the legislature.  This then poses interesting questions for 
scholars:  when do interest groups lobby, and what determines the intensity of that lobbying?   
We can find some initial traction on this question with an examination of the 
retrospective voting literature.  An oft-documented fact in this literature is that voters return 
legislators to office who have delivered favorable policy to constituents during their previous 
term.  These backward looking voters are heavy discounters, valuing recent policy-delivery by 
legislators more highly than those policies passed farther in the past (Fiorina 1981, Downs 1957).  
Legislators, recognizing this voter behavior, have an incentive and desire to pass legislation for 
which they can credit-claim close to their impending re-election (Levitt and Snyder 1997, Stein 
and Bickers 1994, Muthoo and Shepsle 2003).1  This model would then suggest that interest 
groups should attempt to influence legislators when these legislators are ready to pass legislation.  
                                                 
1 This is sometimes called the retrospective voting theory or the WHYDFML (what-have-you-done-for-me-lately) 
theory. 
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That is, interest groups increase their lobbying efforts close to elections because this is the time 
when politicians are trying to credit-claim for legislation that voters will attribute to the 
legislators. 
We can examine this hypothesis by turning to the primary archival dataset that scholars 
of interest group lobbying have employed—the federal lobbying data.  Since 1996, federal law 
has required lobbyists and clients to report the amount of money they spend on lobbying at the 
federal level (see Baumgartner and Leech 2000 for a detailed description of the data).2  In Figure 
1, Panel A, we present a time series of aggregate total lobbying using this data.  Because this 
data is only available for a small number of years, it is not possible to conduct a reliable 
statistical analysis of the results.  However, a casual examination of Panel A exhibits a pattern 
that is consistent with this retrospective voting model.  In the 1998 and 2000 election years, there 
is a jump in lobbying expenditures, preceded by a leveling out in the off-election year. This 
hypothesis, therefore, seems to find some empirical, if not large-sample statistical, evidence in 
the most commonly used dataset of lobbying expenditures at the federal level.   
 
****INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
However, suppose we wish to expand this analysis beyond the five data points and single 
time series of the federal level.  Lobbying expenditures in the states would seem to be a 
reasonable candidate to for more data.  In Figure 1, Panel B, we illustrate total aggregate 
lobbying expenditures over time in Maryland.  Unlike the federal data, we do not see particularly 
                                                 
2 The data come from the Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org) and from Professor Frank 
Baumgartner’s website (lobby.la.psu.edu).  The 1996 data have been estimated from Professor’s Baumgartner’s site, 
using Baumgartner and Leech (2001) as a guide. 
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large increases in interest group lobbying expenditures during election years.  Rather, there is a 
steady increase in lobbying expenditures throughout the ten years of data.   
We can contrast the timing of lobbying effort in Maryland to Maine.  Figure 1, Panel C 
presents the Maine data, which exhibits a very different pattern of lobbying expenditures over 
time.  Not only is there a “saw tooth” pattern of lobbying effort, the pattern is precisely the 
opposite of the maintained hypothesis-- there are troughs during elections, but peaks in the off-
election year. 
This then leads us to revisit the core research question:  what drives the intensity and 
timing of interest group lobbying?  Moreover, are particular types of interest groups causing the 
peaks and troughs in the data observed in Figure 1, Panel C?  To answer these questions, this 
paper develops a theoretical framework based on policy windows and argues that interest groups 
become active when policy windows arise.  Some policy windows emerge endogenously through 
the work of political entrepreneurs and interest group to create a favorable climate for policy 
change.  Other policy windows open exogenously, because of environmental factors and outside 
events that bring issues to the attention of voters and legislators, creating a desire for policy 
change.  Finally, we argue that policy windows can also arise because of the structure of the 
legislature and the legislative process. Many of these “structural policy windows,” such as the 
budgeting process, will recur periodically, drawing interest groups to the process.  We will argue 
it is these structural policy windows that, on the margin, drive interest groups to lobby. 
 The largest challenge to examining the patterns observed in Figure 1, and the theoretical 
framework proposed, is that the forum in which scholars have empirically examined lobbying—
the federal government—is a single legislative institution (n = 1) with a very short time series of 
lobbying data.  There is not a sufficient cross-section or time-series of data to statistically 
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examine variation in lobbying expenditures as they relate to the structure of legislatures.  To 
remedy this problem, this paper introduces a dataset of lobbying in each of the states.  The paper 
offers aggregate level data on 33 states, and fine-grained data on nine of those states, covering an 
average of nine years per state.  These states have different legislative features, different electoral 
features, and different characteristics that allow us to compare the timing and intensity of 
lobbying by interest groups. 
Thus the paper makes a number of empirical contributions.  First, it is the first paper to 
examine lobbying expenditures at the state level.  Second, this is also the first paper to conduct a 
comparative study of lobbying effort across states.  Third, this is the first study to examine 
statistically the timing of legislative lobbying.3  The panel nature of the dataset enables us to 
pursue this goal.  Finally, the paper refocuses our interest group lens on budgeting, the 
importance of which we discuss throughout the paper.4  Building upon a well-documented 
literature that has examined the micro-foundations of lobbying, this paper examines the sources 
of institutional variation and features that drive the lobbying effort.   
The paper demonstrates that structural policy windows, and the budgeting process in 
particular, are a magnet for special interests, causing these groups to substantially increase their 
lobbying effort.  Contrary to the initial hypothesis, lobbying actually decreases in election years, 
relative to off-election years.  We find that business groups, which account for 86% of the 
lobbying expenditures in the nine states for which we have detailed data, are the prime drivers 
behind the increased lobbying during legislative budgeting.  However, business groups have 
much lower variation in lobbying effort from year to year than any other category of special 
                                                 
3 There has been one recent statistical study examining the timing of lobbying in administrative agencies (de 
Figueiredo and Kim, 2004).  Stratmann (1998) and Snyder (1992) have examined the timing of PAC contributions.   
4 Baumgartner and Leech (2000), in an unpublished paper, have recognized the importance of budgetary interest 
group behavior in a cross-section of the federal data. 
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interests.  These latter two results combined suggest that small changes in business group 
lobbying can have big effects on overall lobbying expenditures.  In addition, groups substantially 
influenced by the state budget and groups substantially influenced by regulation both increase 
lobbying during budget years.  This result is consistent with the view that non-budget groups 
may be encouraging legislators to attach non-budgetary riders to the budget bill that have higher 
probability of passage than stand-alone legislation would.  Finally, we note that laws governing 
disclosure of interest group activities show no measurable effect on the total amount of lobbying 
activity disclosed.  Taken together, the statistics demonstrate that the structural features of 
political institutions that create recurring policy windows, and budgets in particular, have a large 
effect on the timing and intensity of interest group lobbying, and that businesses drive these 
patterns. 
In the next section, the paper outlines a theoretical framework and discusses why current 
empirical papers have not yet explored the timing of interest group lobbying.  Section III 
describes the core data, methods, and empirical results.  Sections IV examines what types of 
groups are driving the variation in lobbying effort.  The paper concludes in Section V. 
 
II. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL UNDERPINNINGS 
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:  TYPES OF POLICY WINDOWS 
We begin by developing a framework for understanding the timing of interest group 
lobbying.  Although there are a number of theories of interest group activity, there are no formal 
or informal theories (of which we are aware) on the timing of interest lobbying 5  There is, 
however, a common thread in the literature that argues interest groups become active when 
                                                 
5 Austen-Smith (1993) has developed a model of lobbying for agenda setting and then for votes, however, this is 
usually considered within the same bill. 
  6
policy windows open (Price 1978).  Policy windows are those time periods when there exists a 
favorable climate for changes to legislation.  Legislators focus more of their attention on the 
issue at hand, and are disposed to consider whether and how the policy should be changed 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Grossman and Helpman 1999, 2001). 
In the literature, policy windows arise through two main processes.  First, policy 
windows arise through the political entrepreneurship of legislators and the “offensive” activity of 
interest groups in creating these policy windows (Wilson 1980, Lowi 1964).  Individual 
legislators are constantly seeking issues with which they can be identified to enhance their re-
electability.  Interest groups support legislators in these pursuits, creating and disseminating 
information to create a climate for an opening of the window (Hall and Wayman 1990, Fenno 
1973).  Through this mechanism, policy windows are created endogenously, through the 
planning of interest groups and legislators (Kollman 1997). Tax policy, telecommunications 
bills, and banking deregulation all usually have these types of characteristics.  We call these 
policy windows endogenous policy windows.   
A second method by which policy windows arise is through exogenous and or 
environmental events which refocus legislator attention on a given policy area (Price 1978).  For 
example, the September 11 attacks upon the World Trade Centers created a policy window for 
the airlines and homeland security, the Enron and MCI accounting scandals created a policy 
window for “good governance” interest groups, and the eastern seaboard electrical grid failure 
created a policy window for both the energy industry and environmentalists.  In this approach to 
policy windows, special interests are largely viewed as opportunists, targeting their lobbying 
efforts when these exogenous events happen (Arnold 1990, Walker 1991).  We call these policy 
windows exogenous policy windows.   
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However, a third mechanism by which recurring policy windows arise is through 
structural, legislated, or procedural mechanisms.  That is, features of political institutions 
determine the creation of policy windows, and thus the timing of interest group activities.  These 
policy windows may be micro-structural policy windows, usually created legislatively, that 
pertain to a given piece of legislation or issue area.  For example, in the 1990s, the granting of 
most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status to China required annual renewal, creating a recurring 
policy window for legislators to act.  Likewise, before the advent of automatic cost-of-living-
adjustments to Social Security, Congress visited the benefit levels annually choosing how large 
of a benefit increase to authorize Social Security recipients—creating another particularized 
structural policy windows.  Alternatively, these recurring policy windows may be macro-
structural windows, usually determined constitutionally or procedurally, that affect a large 
number of issues before the legislature.  One structural feature of government that create these 
policy windows is the convening of the legislature. It is not surprising that when the legislature is 
in session a rise in interest group activity occurs.  However, another institutional feature that has 
received attention in the literature on congressional budgeting, but has been largely overlooked 
in the interest group literature, is the timing and process of budgeting in legislatures.6  Special 
interests can extract favors from the government in the budgeting process through the actual 
budget itself or the attachment of regulatory and other riders to the budget bill.  This suggests 
that the budgeting process should be particularly susceptible to special interest lobbying 
(Wildavsky 1979, Wander et al 1984) in a periodic and recurring manner.  It is during these 
times that interest groups will become active.  We call these recurring policy windows structural 
policy windows. 
                                                 
6 There is an extensive literature on budgeting and the determinants of fiscal responsibility in the states.  See Alt and 
Lowry (1993) and Lowry et al (1998) for an example. 
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B.  THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE AND DATA LIMITATIONS 
The empirical studies of interest groups have been centered on an examination of interest 
group activity at the federal level.  Papers that have examined congressional lobbying have 
focused, generally, on three types of analyses.  First, papers have statistically and descriptively 
examined individual issues to describe how competing interest groups position themselves to 
lobby over a given issue (Rothenberg 1992, Derthick and Quirk 1985; for an excellent summary, 
see Smith 1995, Baumgartner and Leech 1998).  These studies, however, have a number of 
limitations because they are generally on single issues and one cannot compare lobbying 
behavior across issues.   
This has led to a second set of papers covering lobbying expenditures at the federal level 
(Baumgartner and Leech 2001, Ansolabehere et al 2003, de Figueiredo and Silverman 2002).  
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 provided data to scholars on annual lobbying expenditures 
at the federal level.  While these papers yield results on the make-up of lobbying expenditures, 
the degree of access accorded to interest groups, and the effectiveness of lobbying effort, the 
analysis is almost always cross-sectional, based on one year of data.  Moreover, because the data 
is only at the federal level where budgeting, for example, occurs annually, it is difficult to 
identify any structural, comparative, or timing issues that can be analyzed.     
A final important literature this paper speaks to is the literature on lobbying at the state 
level.  Lowery and Gray (2000) have extensively examined the number of lobbyist registrations 
across the states.  Taking registrations at periodic intervals (usually 5-years apart), the authors 
have developed a theory of interest representation based upon the population ecology variables 
of competition and legitimation. This data has been used to explore a number of factors affecting 
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the prevalence of interest groups in states.  Complementing their work is a host of case studies 
that have examined similar issues (Hrebenar and Thomas 1992, 1993).   While these papers have 
extended our comparative work in the area of interest groups, they have generally limited their 
analysis to the number of lobbying groups, and from that, sometimes make inference about the 
intensity interest group activity.  Whether this latter step is valid is an open question.  This paper 
addresses these three shortcomings. 
 
III.  CORE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. DATA 
The panel dataset employed in this section comprises state-year aggregate lobbying 
expenditures across all states where available.  The total aggregate lobbying expenditure by state 
by year was obtained from each state (either the Ethics Commission or the relevant office).  
Thirty-three states provided us with the data.  The remaining states either did not collect the data 
or collected but did not keep the data.  The range of time periods is 3 years to 25 years of data for 
each state.  All data are converted to 2000 real dollars, deflated by the consumer price index 
(CPI-U).  To create our dependent variable for the statistical analyses, we take the log of the 
state’s per capita lobbying expenditure in a given year.7  A full description of all the data and the 
data sources is provided in the Appendix. 
There are three sets of independent variables.  The first set measures the electoral factors 
that might affect interest group activity.  This includes variables on whether there is an election 
in the current time period for legislative seats, whether there is unified government, whether 
there is Democratic unified government (Wiggins et al 1992), and the size of the majorities in the 
House and Senate of each state. 
                                                 
7 This further reduces the effect of outliers and other potential anomalies in the data. 
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A second set of variables includes characteristics of the institutional design and 
legislative process of each state.   These variables measure whether the legislature is required to 
meet in regular session, whether the legislature is required to meet in special session, and 
whether the state is required to engage in creating a new budget in a particular year.  These are 
the variables that underlie the structural policy windows we are interested in.  We code these as 
dummy variables with a one if the state is in a regular session in a special session, or in a budget 
year, and zero otherwise, for the three separate variables.   
A third set of independent variables provides controls for the state characteristics that 
move over time.  This includes data on the state’s per capita income.  We also include variables 
for the year and the year-squared. 
 
B.  DESCRIPTIVE DATA 
To capture the variation in the timing of lobbying effort, we analyze three representative 
states:  New York, Wisconsin, and Oregon.  These have been chosen because they represent 
three different institutional structures of the legislative process.  New York has annual regular 
sessions and annual budgeting; Wisconsin has annual regular sessions and biennial budgeting 
and Oregon has biennial regular sessions and biennial budgeting.  We provide the data in Figure 
2.  What is striking about these three graphs is their responsiveness to the budgeting process.  
While New York sees a steady increase in real lobbying expenditures, Oregon’s and Wisconsin’s 
lobbying expenditures increase substantially in budget years, and drop in off-budget years.  In 
addition, comparing Oregon to Wisconsin, we seem to see a regular session effect as well.  This 
descriptive data provides initial support to the fact that institutional design may affect interest 
group effort, and in particular, budgeting may be the focal point for interest groups.  However, to 
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more thoroughly examine the structural windows hypothesis in the paper, we turn to a 
multivariate statistical analysis. 
 
****INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
C.  METHOD 
In order to examine the empirical validity of the theoretical framework, we conduct an 
OLS regression on panel data.  One concern that naturally arises in this kind of panel study is 
that states differ widely in their lobbying disclosure rules.  What is considered lobbying in one 
state is not necessarily considered lobbying in another state, and thus need not be reported.  To 
control for this, we use state fixed-effects in our statistical analyses.  The fixed effects estimation 
method controls for differences across states, and allows us to measure within state variation 
over time with panel data methods (Hsiao 2002).  With state fixed effects, we include a dummy 
variable for each state.  later specifications, we explore random-effects models as well 
 
D.  RESULTS 
Table 1 provides initial results.  The dependent variable is the log of annual, per capita 
interest group lobbying expenditures.  Model 1 includes the control variables (Ln(Per Capita 
Income), Year, and Year2) with the electoral variables (Election Year, Size of House Majority, 
Size of Senate Majority, Unified Government, and Democratic Unified).  Model 2 includes the 
control variables with the legislative structure variables (Budget Year, Regular Session, and 
Special Session).  Model 3 includes all three sets of variables.  Model 4 includes interaction 
effects.  All models include state fixed effects for the 33 states considered.  A positive coefficient 
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on a variable means an increase in the variable increases the amount of lobbying within a state 
relative to mean level of lobbying for that state; a negative coefficient means an increase in the 
variable of interest decreases the amount of lobbying.  Standard errors of the coefficients are 
listed in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates.  Statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, 
and 90% level are noted.   
 
****INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
We begin by discussing the income variable.  Per capita income has a large effect on 
expected lobbying expenditures in all the models.  A 1% increase in a given state’s per capita 
income results in an approximately 7.3% increase in lobbying.  This result is similar in sign, but 
greater in magnitude, to a result found for PAC contributions in earlier work (Ansolabehere et al 
2003), where per capita income has substantial power in explaining the levels of campaign 
contributions in gubernatorial campaigns.   
We turn now to electoral variables.  In Model 1, the coefficients on Election Year and the 
Size of Senate Majority are statistically significant and negative.  In this model, an Election Year 
causes lobbying to decrease by 18%, while each percentage increase in the size of the majority 
by the majority party in the state senate causes lobbying to decrease by 1.3%.  Though the 
former result is not robust once we include legislative structure variables in Model 3, we will see 
in Model 4 that this result reappears as statistically significant.  The latter result persists in its 
statistical significance across all models.  No other electoral variables are statistically significant 
in this model. 
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We then add the institutional structure variables in Models 2 and 3; here we obtain some 
interesting effects.  We discuss the results of Model 3, as it is similar to Model 2.  First, when a 
legislature is in regular session, lobbying skyrockets about 190% over what it would be 
otherwise.  While this is expected, it is interesting to note that this effect holds even when we 
control for special sessions.  In fact, special sessions do not result in more lobbying.  In addition, 
we see a 20% increase in lobbying if during those sessions, the budget is under consideration.  
That is, lobbying interests increase their efforts substantially during budget years in response to 
the budgeting process.  This is one of the main findings of this paper.  Both of these effects, 
which are statistically significant, cannot be observed in the federal lobbying data because 
Congress meets and budgets on an annual basis.  The budgeting process, a recurring structural 
policy window, attracts interest groups and results in substantially higher lobbying effort by 
these groups. 
Model 4 includes an interaction term of regular session with election year.  Inclusion of 
this term leaves most coefficient estimates close to their former magnitudes and statistical 
significance.  The interaction term, however, is positive and statistically significant.  The results 
show that while lobbying increases 77% during regular sessions, it increases an additional 145% 
(total of 222%) during election years if there is a regular session.  The coefficient on Election 
Year is also now negative and statistically significant.  It means that lobbying declines 
substantially (40%) during election years, unless there is a regular session held.  If this latter 
condition holds, however, the total marginal effect of Election Year (the sum of the marginal 
effects of Election Year and Regular Session*Election Year, holding Regular Session at 1) is 
almost zero, allowing us to interpret the negative direct effect of elections on lobbying as almost 
exactly canceling out the positive effect of having a legislature in session during elections. 
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Taken together, these results suggest that the timing of sessions and budgeting bring out 
interest group activity in the legislature.  While most electoral factors seem to have little effect 
on the timing of lobbying, there are two exceptions.  First, the size of the senate majority has a 
persistent and statistically significant negative effect on lobbying.  In addition, elections tend to 
decrease lobbying (relative to off-election years) unless the legislature is in session, in which 
case, the total electoral effect is substantively close to zero.   
 
E. ROBUSTNESS AND EXTENSIONS 
In order to check the robustness of the results presented in Table 1, we conduct a number 
of tests whose results we present in Table 2.  First, we explore the possibility that the size of the 
budget is what drives aggregate lobbying expenditures.  To this end, we construct a variable that 
represents the amount of the budget under consideration in each year.8  We present the results in 
Model 5 of Table 2 with caution, only as a robustness check, because the size of the budget may 
be endogenous to lobbying effort.  With that caveat, we note that a 1% increase in the budget 
results in an 8% increase in lobbying expenditures.  This is consistent with results in the earlier 
models.  The effect of Regular Session is slightly less than in previous models.  The only 
electoral variables which have statistically significant coefficients are the Size of Majority 
variables. The Election Year variable and the interactive variable are not statistically significant, 
but their magnitudes are almost the same as before. 
 
                                                 
8 We take the amount of the budget in any given year.  For those with biennial budgets, a problem arises.  In the off-
years, the budget is zero.  We could model this, but then if we take logs, these observations disappear.  Moreover the 
results, if we just use budget levels, are similar to the dummy variable specification.  To address this concern, we 
use 90% of the two-year budget in the budgeted year, and 10% of the budget in the second year.  The rationale is 
that in any given off-year, up to 10% of the budget can be re-budgeted during special session to accommodate fiscal 
needs.  Thus, the amount of budget up for grabs is about 10% of the entire budget.  We then adjust the budget for per 
capita spending then take logs. 
  15
****INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
Second, there may be other institutional features that affect lobbying that have been 
missed in the main analysis.  We have catalogued six types of institutional structures that might 
affect the intensity and timing of lobbying:  the presence of budget caps (Primo 2003), legislative 
term limits (Primo and Milyo 2004), the degree of professionalization of the legislature (Fiorina 
1994; Maestas 2000), the number of seats in the state house and senate chambers, the size of the 
veto-proof majority (Holburn and Vanden Bergh 2004), and the ease with which the legislature 
can overturn administrative agencies (Weingast and Moran 1983).  We measure these variables 
as noted in the Appendix.  One problem with including them in the statistical analysis, however, 
is that these do not change within state over time.  Therefore one cannot used state fixed effects 
in a regression if one hopes to include these variables.  However, one can use a random effects 
model.   
To test the robustness of the random effects model, Model 6 replicates Model 4 using 
random effects.  The coefficient estimates and the statistical significance of those coefficients are 
very close across the models.  A Hausman specification test indicates that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the fixed effects and random effects models are the same at the 
95% level of confidence.  Having established the comparability of the random effects and fixed 
effects model, we then include in Model 7 the variables measuring the additional institutional 
features using random effects.  None of the additional institutional structure variables have 
statistically significant coefficients, suggesting we can reject the hypothesis that they influence 
total lobbying expenditures at the 95% level of confidence. 
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A fourth issue is whether lobbying disclosure regulations are driving the result.  Some 
authors have suggested that tighter lobbying disclosure regulations result in less lobbying 
because disclosure can tarnish the reputation of the lobbyists and the lobbying profession  
(Brinig et al 1994).  Other authors have argued that lobbying regulations have little effect on 
lobbying firms (Lowery and Gray 1997).  These papers cite as evidence for these points of view 
the number of lobbyists registered.  In conducting this robustness check, we also hope to settle 
this argument by employing, as the dependent variable, actual lobbying expenditures. 
There are two general types of lobbying disclosure rules.  The first are the types that 
expand the definition of lobbying.  These include new rules that include small gifts to legislators 
as lobbying expenditures, rules that include certain types of events as lobbying expenditures, and 
rules that expand the definition of lobbying activities (such as to include any meetings with 
legislators rather than just those to discuss a specific bill).  These types of changes in lobbying 
rules should result in an increase in lobbying expenditures disclosed.  A second type of 
disclosure rule is one that does not expand the definition of lobbying, but requires groups to 
disclose their lobbying expenditures in a more detailed and refined way.  For example, rules that 
require interest groups to categorize their lobbying expenditures and rules that require lobbying 
groups disclose their source of funding should not increase disclosed lobbying expenditures per 
se, but should offer the public more disclosure on the current expenditures. 
In Model 8, we replicate the base Model 4 using these variables.  Neither type of 
disclosure law has an effect on the reported amount of lobbying activity by interest groups.   
This result is consistent with Lowery and Gray (1997) who show that tougher lobbyist 
registration rules in the state have no effect on the number of lobbying registration, but 
inconsistent with (Brinig et al 1994).  We can make a similar statement about the effect of 
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disclosure laws on the reported amount of lobbying.  On the whole, these sets of laws lead to no 
change in the disclosed aggregate lobbying expenditures.  This, however, does not mean that 
there is no change in lobbyist behavior (as has been argued in earlier work), only that whatever 
changes there are do not show up in disclosed aggregate lobbying expenditures.  
Overall, this section supports the previous results that structural policy windows, as 
determined by the frequency of sessions and the budgeting process, are the primary drivers of 
changes in total aggregate lobbying expenditures. Moreover, other factors, such as budget caps, 
term limits, professionalization of legislatures, and lobbying disclosure rules have little impact 
on disclosed lobbying expenditures. 
 
IV.  UNDERSTANDING THE GROUPS THAT CREATE THIS PATTERN 
Having established the empirical fact that budgets draw interest groups to lobby 
legislatures, we now want to understand which groups create this pattern in the data.  To do this, 
we rely on very fine-grained data for nine states who agreed to provide us with data.  These nine 
states’ Ethics Commission keep time-series data on each individual interest group’s lobby 
expenditure each year (for four to ten years).  There are over 35,000 interest group-state-year 
observations of expenditures, covering more than 5,000 separate state-level interest groups.   
 
A. SIMILARITIES TO POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES 
In order to benchmark the aggregate lobbying data, we begin by comparing the lobbying 
efforts of interest groups to campaign finance contributions of interest groups.  We use the 
classification system used by scholars of political action committee (PAC) contributions (e.g. 
Ansolabehere et al 2002) and the Federal Election Commission (2001) that categorizes each of 
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the interest groups into one of four areas:  businesses, trade associations, membership/ideological 
groups, and unions.  We have added a “government” category as well because lobbying by state 
agencies or city governments is required to be reported in many states.  This categorization of 
lobbying expenditures allows us to compare our results to the PAC literature. 
First we describe the lobbying data.  Reported per capita lobbying expenditures differ 
vastly by state from $.01 to $18.32, with a mean of $2.44.  A variety of reasons exist for this 
variation, not the least of which is the laws regarding disclosure.  Within states, however, there 
can still be substantial variation in lobbying across different categories of interest groups and 
across years.  Table 3 uses our preliminary categorization of groups to identify the expenditures 
for each group for all years’ data available for the nine states for which we have this data.  While 
one must be careful when comparing amounts across states (because of different disclosure 
rules), comparisons within state do provide a snapshot of lobbying effort.  Here we see that in 
every state, firms and trade associations account for no less than 80% (86% average) of lobbying 
expenditure.  Unions spend less than 4.2% of total lobbying expenditures in each state.  
Membership groups account for 3%-15% of total lobbying expenditures.9   
 
****INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
In Table 4, we contrast the distribution of lobbying expenditures with PAC contributions.  
The data sources are listed in the table.10  At the federal level, business (corporations and trade 
                                                 
9 Whether this means that business interests exert more influence in lobbying than do labor and issue groups is 
unclear.  Only future study will allow us to understand this question.  Moreover, this preliminary finding helps to 
explain the findings of earlier studies that document business interests having far more lobbyist registrations than 
labor and membership groups.  This higher number of registrations is manifested in more lobbying expenditures. 
10 The data on state PAC/Special Interest money is approximate.  The Institute of Money in State Politics (IMSP) 
hires contractors to collect data from the states on all state campaign finance contributions.  We have checked their 
data against state records (collected by the state election commissions) against Jensen and Beyle (2003) and find that 
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associations) comprise 67% of PAC giving, while they comprise 84% of lobbying expenditures.  
At the state level, these business groups comprise 62% of special interest contributions, but 86% 
of lobbying expenditures.  Labor groups comprise 9% of federal PAC contributions, and 6% of 
federal lobbying, while at the state level, labor groups comprise 16% of special interest 
contributions to campaigns and only 2% of lobbying expenditures.  Finally, although 
membership and ideological groups make up a roughly equivalent percentage of campaign 
finance contributions at the federal and state level (22%-23%), they represent 7% of lobbying 
expenditures at the state level and only 2% at the federal level.  Overall, these results suggest that 
lobbying is largely a business phenomenon at both the state and federal level, but the business 
community focuses more on lobbying and less on campaign finance at the state level than the 
federal level. 
 
****INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
B. GROUP TYPE AND LOBBYING TIMING 
Taking the categorization given above, we examine whether different types of groups 
time their lobbying in systematically discernible ways.  To analyze this question, we sum each 
category of groups’ expenditures, so that we know how much unions are spending in each state 
by year; how much membership groups are spending in each state by year, etc.  From this, we 
create a set of new dependent variables for the next set of regressions to try to identify the 
underlying patterns of lobbying.  We aggregate the lobbying expenditures by interest group 
                                                                                                                                                             
they are somewhat close—approximately within 5-10% of each other.  We then used the classification system from 
the IMSP to classify the state PAC data.  Ideological and Party Groups were classified as Ideological/Membership.  
Unions and Civil Service/Retirement groups were classified as Unions.  All others were classified as corporations 
and trade associations collectively.  The data in Tables 4 provide the detailed data on the state level for the nine 
states listed in Table 3. 
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category by state on a per capita basis and take logs.  We now take this as our dependent variable 
and re-run Model 4 to see if certain groups are driving the aggregate pattern of lobbying 
observed.  In this section, each observation is a state, year, interest-group-type aggregate 
lobbying expenditure.   Again, we use OLS with state fixed effects in the regressions. 
Because only nine states are reported here, there are only 53 observations.  With 13 
explanatory variables and nine fixed effects, there are not many degrees of freedom, meaning 
that the standard errors are likely to be large.  With this caveat, we present our results in Table 5 
 
****INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
Model 9 includes lobbying by firms, Model 10 includes lobbying by trade associations, 
Model 11 uses lobbying by unions, Model 12 uses lobbying by government agencies, and Model 
13 uses lobbying by membership groups.  In all the models the coefficients on Budget Year and 
Regular Session are positive.  In Models 9 and 10 (collectively business), per capita lobbying 
expenditures are 40% higher for firms and 28% higher for trade associations in budget years than 
non-budget years.  These results are statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence.  In 
Models 11, 12, and 13, we see that per capita lobbying expenditures are 38% higher, 50% higher, 
and 84% higher for unions, governments, and membership groups, respectively, in budget years 
relative to non-budget years.  These coefficients, however, do not reach the standard levels of 
statistical significance, perhaps because of the few degrees of freedom.  Although a handful of 
other coefficients are statistically significant, there is no systematic pattern.  However, it is 
worthwhile noting that unions are the only type of interest group that has a positive coefficient 
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on Election Year and negative coefficient on the interaction term.  In addition, government 
interest groups increase their lobbying substantially during periods of unified government. 
Taken together, these results lead us to a number of interpretations of the data.  First, all 
groups lobby at substantially higher levels when the legislature is in regular session, but none of 
the coefficients are statistically significant at the 95% level.  Second, the increase in lobbying 
expenditures during budget years seems to be driven by business, and not by unions or 
government agencies.  Third, given the relative magnitude of the budget coefficients of the five 
models, businesses exhibit lower variation in lobbying expenditures from year to year than other 
organizations.  This fact, combined with the fact that business accounts for over 80% of lobbying 
expenditures (noted in the previous section), suggests that businesses maintain a continued 
presence in state capitals, lobbying on a regular basis, while other groups maintain a more 
sporadic lobbying effort.  Moreover, when budgets arise, businesses raise their lobbying 
expenditures somewhat.  However, because businesses represent such a large percentage of total 
lobbying expenditures, the 30-35% increase in lobbying expenditures they engage in during 
budget years means they create a large increase in aggregate state lobbying expenditures.  
Fundamentally, the spikes seen in the biennial budgeting states shown in Figures 1 and 2 are 
generated by business interest groups. 
 
C. ISSUE AREAS AND LOBBYING TIMING 
Although businesses are driving the spikes and troughs in lobbying, in a final empirical 
extension, we examine the extent to which groups affected by different policies of government 
time their lobbying differentially.  We do this by examining the timing of lobbying by issue area.  
We classify each interest group in these nine states as primarily concerned with one of thirty-two 
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issue areas.  We then create two main “types” of interest group categories:  groups which are 
affected by both budgetary and regulatory rules of the state, and those groups which are affected 
primarily by regulatory rules.   
To implement this, we use a classification system developed by Wolak et al (2004).  
Wolak et al obtained the names of every interest group that lobbied at the state level in 1997 
(over 34,000 in total).  They then categorized each group by topic area they identified. We have 
taken the Wolak et al coding and merged it into our file, adding eight additional categories to 
obtain more fine-grained detail.  However we have panel data, and new interest groups enter 
every year into each state.  We conducted web searches until every interest group was identified 
using this classification system.  Table 6 presents the classification.   
 
****INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
In addition to the two broad categories we identified above, we also examine issue areas 
where the lobbying efforts by interest groups which most legislators might like to “hide” from 
their constituents.  These issue areas, such as tobacco firm lobbying, pharmaceutical lobbying, 
real estate developer lobbying, alcohol lobbying, and gambling industry lobbying, may be 
particularly problematic for legislators, and we examine this is more detail. 
We recognize this classification is somewhat stylized and rough.  In reality, there is a 
continuum between how much an interest group is affected by budgets and how much an interest 
group is affected by regulation.  We do believe to a first approximation, however, that these 
budget categories reflect where the preponderance of state’s influence is on the special interest’s 
business (e.g. education is both budgetary and regulatory, while insurance is primarily 
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regulatory).  That said, we have experimented with a number of reasonable reclassifications and 
find the results discussed below are robust to these reclassifications. 
As before, we sum each topic area’s expenditures, so that we know how much agriculture 
is spending in each state by year; how much health groups are spending in each state by year, etc. 
for the nine states.   We aggregate the lobbying expenditures by issue by state by year on a per 
capita basis and take logs to create the final dependent variables, and run models similar to the 
previous section, using OLS with both state and issue area fixed effects. 
Given that budgetary issues can only be handled within the budget framework, one would 
expect that these issues would result in more lobbying within the legislature during budget years 
than non-budget years.  Regulatory issues, on the other hand, do not result in the direct transfer 
of money from the government to the interest groups in contracts or spending, but are molded by 
government policies and regulatory power to create the competitive environment.  Because these 
regulations can be passed at any time, there are two factors that affect the timing of regulatory 
lobbying expenditures.  On one hand, it is less costly to pass policy proposals that are attached as 
riders to the budget, rather than stand-alone bills, because the budget must pass annually, and the 
process of amending the budget in committee (or on the floor) is generally less onerous than 
passing a regulation as a stand-alone feature (Oleszek 1996, Krutz 2001).  Thus, from a cost 
perspective, interest groups are more likely to have success passing regulatory rules during 
budgeting, and therefore we should see an increase in regulatory lobbying during budget years.  
On the other hand, in a retrospective voting model with heavy discounting, legislators may get 
more credit for passing legislation close to the election rather than in previous time periods.  If 
this is the case, then legislators benefit more passing legislation close to the election rather than 
earlier.  In a biennial budgeting state, higher benefit would be conveyed in the off-budget year 
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(or the election year).  This would lead to higher incentive to pass bills in the off-budget year.  
Which effect dominates is an empirical matter.  If we see regulatory groups lobbying more 
heavily in budget years, we assume that the “rider” effect dominates.  However, if we see 
regulatory groups lobbying more heavily in election years, then the “retrospective voting” effect 
dominates. 
Table 7 presents the results.  Model 14 presents the results for budgetary and regulatory 
issues, Model 15 presents the results for primarily regulatory issues, and Model 16 presents the 
results for “hidden groups.” 11 In Model 14, the coefficient on Budget Year is positive and 
statistically significant.  There is, not surprisingly, a 39% increase in lobbying by groups 
concerned with budgetary issues during budget years.  There is a 50% decrease in lobbying by 
these same groups during election years, though a session during an election year leads to 
slightly more lobbying on net (through the interactive effect).  Unified government of either 
party leads to 46% more lobbying than during spells of divided government.   
 
****INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
Many of the results in Model 15 are similar.  Groups that are concerned primarily about 
regulatory issues lobby even more in budget years, on the margin, than those concerned about 
budgets.  There is 49% increase in lobbying for these groups during budget years, an increase 
which is statistically significant at the 99% level.  Special sessions also result in more regulatory 
lobbying.  The Election Year coefficients are not statistically significant.  Republican unified 
government results in 30% additional lobbying than non-unified government, while Democratic 
                                                 
11 One concern that may arise is that budget years sometimes have longer sessions than non-budget years.  To 
control for this, we replaced the session year variable with short session and long session variables and re-run the 
regressions.  The results are nearly identical. 
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unified government results in 9% less lobbying than non-unified government.  This latter result 
actually points to groups affected by regulation may be lobbying heavily for deregulation rather 
than regulation.  In sum, despite having fewer budgetary concerns, groups primarily affected by 
regulations do more lobbying during budgetary years and during Republican unified government. 
Finally, Model 16 includes regressions for “hidden groups,” those groups that legislators 
likely wish to hide from the voters.  These groups show no discernible pattern of lobbying, as no 
variable has a coefficient that is statistically significant.  These groups seem to spread their 
lobbying effort evenly across time, political and electoral factors, and institutional structures, 
which may be a sensible strategy if groups wish to remain hidden. 
Overall, these final results paint an interesting picture of the composition of the lobbying 
effort by interest groups.  While groups affected by the budget do increase their lobbying 
expenditures during budget years, groups not affected by the budget also increase their lobbying 
expenditures during budget years.  One reason for this may be that these latter groups are 
attempting to create or prevent riders from being attached to the budget that will affect the 
regulations that govern them.  Indeed, given the budget bill must pass on an annual basis, 
attaching riders to the budget is a less costly mechanism for passing regulations than is passing 
the bill in stand-alone form.  The fact that regulatory lobbying picks up when there is Republican 
unified government is yet another indication that groups seeking lower hurdles for regulation 
may be lobbying during this opportune moment—when friends in office are passing must-pass 
budgetary legislation—offering a good time for attaching riders to the budget bill.  Note that 
controversial groups, whose lobbying efforts legislators might want to hide from the voters, seem 
to blend into other lobbying efforts, demonstrating no discernible statistical pattern in lobbying. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
This paper complements the extensive micro-oriented (or single vote or single-issue) 
literature on interest groups by examining the macro-determinants and timing of interest group 
lobby.  In doing so, it has argued that there are three types of policy windows that arise for 
interest groups:  endogenous windows, exogenous windows, and structural windows.  The paper 
argues that structural windows can have a significant effect on the timing of interest group 
lobbying.  Employing a new dataset of lobbying at the state level, the paper exploits cross-state 
and time-series variation to determine how features of government affect lobbying expenditures.  
The paper demonstrates that interest groups increase their activities substantially when the 
legislature is in regular session and when the legislature is engaged in budgeting.  It also 
demonstrates that much of this budget year effect can be explained by business and trade groups 
expanding lobbying efforts during budget years.  Unions and government agencies do not 
increase lobbying efforts during this time.   
Moreover, businesses, which comprise on average 86% of all lobbying expenditures 
within a given state, have much lower variance in lobbying than other groups.  This is consistent 
with the idea that businesses maintain a steady and continued presence in legislatures, while 
other types of interest groups expand and contract their lobbying as their resources and the issues 
that interest them, rise and decline in the legislature.  Additionally, interest groups largely 
unaffected by the budget numbers also lobby during budgetary time periods.  One reason for this 
is that they may be encouraging legislators to use the budget as a vehicle on which to attach non-
budgetary riders. 
One final result from the paper is that elections have a negative or no (in the interaction 
term) effect on timing of lobbying, contrary to some received wisdom.  It is clear that the 
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variation in institutional structure of state governments allows us to see structural policy 
windows that might not otherwise be discernible.  Moreover, the data presented here will allow 
us to explore in more depth the determinants of interest group lobbying effort.  
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Wisconsin
(Annual Sessions; Biennial Budgets)
1978 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Electoral Model Legislative Model Base Model
Full Model with 
Interactive Effects
Budget Year 0.215*** 0.197** 0.231***
(0.067) (0.080) (0.081)
Regular Session 1.057*** 1.063*** 0.575**
(0.128) (0.128) (0.267)
Special Session 0.051 0.067 0.070
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
Election Year -0.188*** -0.023 -0.581**
(0.046) (0.048) (0.273)
Size of House Majority 0.840 0.960* 0.984*
(0.688) (0.572) (0.568)
Size of Senate Majority -1.289** -1.427*** -1.407***
(0.620) (0.518) (0.515)
Unified Government -0.009 -0.018 -0.020
(0.117) (0.097) (0.096)
Democratic Unified -0.028 -0.039 -0.029
(0.143) (0.119) (0.118)
Ln(Per Capita Income) 2.019*** 2.355*** 1.997*** 1.999***
(0.505) (0.404) (0.419) (0.416)
Year 16.608*** 16.354*** 16.424*** 16.507***
(2.488) (2.071) (2.064) (2.052)
Year2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Regular Session * Election Year 0.595**
(0.287)
Constant -16,641.48*** -16,392.22*** -16,460.94*** -16,543.26***
(2,475.84) (2,061.20) (2,054.56) (2,042.67)
State Fixed Effects FE FE FE FE
R-squared 0.713 0.798 0.805 0.808
F-statistic 86.54 184.54 103.35 96.24
n 319 319 319 319
Two-sided t-tests with robust standard errors: *** 99% significance level; ** 95% significance level;  *90% significance level
Table 1:  Electoral and Institutional Determinants of Aggregate Lobbying Expenditures
Dependent Variable:  Log of Total Per Capita Lobbying Expenditures for each state for each year
Note:  Thirty-three states are included in the analysis, state fixed effects (FE) are used for all Models. 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Budget Amount Full Model with RE
Structural 
Measures with RE
Lobby Reporting 
Rules
Budget Year 0.230*** 0.229*** 0.229***
(0.080) (0.081) (0.081)
Budget Amount 0.082*
(0.044)
Regular Session 0.811** 0.568** 0.565** 0.580**
(0.391) (0.264) (0.266) (0.268)
Special Session 0.066 0.071 0.070 0.070
(0.060) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)
Budget Caps -0.301
(0.735)
Term Limits -0.029
(0.133)
Professional Staff -0.092
(1.222)
Senate Size -0.002
(0.041)
House Size 0.001
(0.010)
Veto Override 3.409
(6.583)
Admin Review Std 0.290
(0.798)
Election Year -0.276 -0.586** -0.588** -0.576**
(0.393) (0.270) (0.272) (0.274)
Size of House Majority 1.398* 0.949* 0.939* 0.961*
(0.751) (0.560) (0.570) (0.572)
Size of Senate Majority -1.475** -1.378*** -1.379*** -1.410***
(0.656) (0.508) (0.512) (0.519)
Unified Government 0.054 -0.044 -0.044 -0.023
(0.121) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096)
Democratic Unified -0.127 -0.001 -0.002 -0.029
(0.155) (0.116) (0.117) (0.118)
Ln(Per Capita Income) 1.815*** 2.073*** 2.037*** 1.924***
(0.504) (0.405) (0.410) (0.449)
Year 15.184*** 16.649*** 16.554*** 15.993***
(3.422) (2.036) (2.075) (2.397)
Year2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Table 2:  Robustness of Determinants of Aggregate Lobbying Expenditures
Dependent Variable:  Log of Total Per Capita Lobbying Expenditures for each state for each year
Regular Session * Election Year 0.252 0.599** 0.601** 0.588**
(0.409) (0.284) (0.286) (0.288)
Definitional Refinement 0.012
(0.116)
Definitional Expansion 0.036
(0.095)
Constant -15,042.65*** -16,648.32*** -16,592.71*** -16,030.81***
(3,402.43) (2,026.30) (2,064.77) (2,387.84)
State Fixed/Random Effects FE RE RE FE
R-squared 0.809 . . 0.808
F-statistic 64.04 . . 81.98
n 224 319 319 319
Two-sided t-tests with robust standard errors: *** 99% significance level; ** 95% significance level;  *90% significance level
Note:  Thirty-three states are included in the analysis, state fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE) are used for all Models, as 
noted. 
Firm Trade Union Government Membership
Idaho $633,994 $1,485,494 $44,107 $5,801 $199,406
254.30% 595.83% 17.69% 2.33% 79.98%
Indiana $22,010,043 $16,029,121 $1,191,370 $2,101,832 $1,430,810
465.92% 339.31% 25.22% 44.49% 30.29%
Kentucky $15,278,490 $14,228,288 $939,042 $721,506 $1,031,886
567.46% 528.45% 34.88% 26.80% 38.33%
Maryland $81,621,524 $59,099,302 $1,798,775 $1,688,856 $9,423,215
632.19% 457.75% 13.93% 13.08% 72.99%
Montana $3,370,952 $4,989,198 $309,407 $664,689 $1,045,513
166.91% 247.04% 15.32% 32.91% 51.77%
Oregon $41,586,521 $55,454,477 $4,954,661 $10,083,137 $8,154,618
179.31% 239.11% 21.36% 43.48% 35.16%
Virginia $28,298,970 $30,452,100 $785,144 $6,821,487 $6,138,544
205.88% 221.55% 5.71% 49.63% 44.66%
Vermont $10,361,286 $9,758,959 $360,064 $44,806 $3,648,474
255.62% 240.76% 8.88% 1.11% 90.01%
Wisconsin $71,416,329 $102,315,604 $7,814,127 $10,613,263 $14,008,523
220.18% 315.44% 24.09% 32.72% 43.19%
TABLE 3:  Total Lobbying Expenditures By Interest Group Category
Note:  Data is for all available years for each state.  Firms and trade associations comprise on average 86% of lobbying 
expenditures in every state, and no less than 80% of lobbying expenditures in any state.
Lobbying PAC Lobbying PAC/Special Interest
Corporations 55% 40% 40%
62%
Trade Associations 29% 27% 46%
Labor 6% 9% 2% 16%
Issue/Ideology/Membership 2% 23% 7% 22%
Other 7% 0% 4% 0%
Note:  All federal lobbying data is for 1997-98 (average) lobbying expenditures.  All federal PAC data is for 1996 and 1998 election 
cycle PAC contributions.  State lobbying data is for nine states as described in paper for all years available.  All state special 
interest/PAC data is for the same nine states in the paper for all years available.  Totals may not add to 100% because of rounding.
Source: FEC (2001); Ansolabahere et al  (2002); Author (2004), The Institute on Money in State Politics (2004)
Table 4:  Distribution of Total Lobbying Expenditures and Special Interest/PAC Expenditures at the 
Federal and State Level
Federal State
Variable Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Firms
Trade 
Associations Union Government
Membership 
Groups
Budget Year 0.356** 0.251** 0.325 0.409 0.612*
(0.133) (0.119) (0.324) (0.466) (0.333)
Regular Session 0.122 0.431* 1.588 0.300 0.088
(0.225) (0.238) (1.242) (1.008) (0.661)
Special Session 0.098 0.233 0.235 -0.062 0.057
(0.150) (0.160) (0.212) (0.203) (0.187)
Election Year -0.446 -0.251 1.266 -0.636 -0.793
(0.407) (0.423) (1.101) (0.722) (0.579)
Size of House Majority -0.655 -0.645 -1.732 0.471 -0.908
(1.464) (1.428) (2.883) (5.651) (2.790)
Size of Senate Majority -1.256 -0.102 -0.505 1.571 -2.962
(1.240) (1.356) (1.961) (2.781) (2.667)
Unified Government 0.157 0.224 0.265 0.810*** 0.234
(0.217) (0.196) (0.258) (0.226) (0.316)
Democratic Unified -0.274 -0.387* -0.051 -0.626 -0.405
(0.242) (0.225) (0.647) (0.657) (0.349)
Ln(Per Capita Income) 6.131 1.236 -2.377 -2.548 9.250
(4.874) (4.570) (8.253) (8.643) (8.398)
Year 16.282 -20.508 -119.605 -9.621 -25.853
(34.535) (34.841) (79.870) (95.724) (56.078)
Year2 -0.004 0.005 0.03 0.002 0.006
(0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.024) (0.014)
Session Year * Election Year 0.476 0.263 -1.161 0.747 1.005
(0.424) (0.441) (1.224) (1.073) (0.768)
Constant -16,266.07 20,435.98 119,343.70 9,501.36 25,817.80
(34,502.95) (34,819.60) (79,732.60) (95,595.75) (56,019.44)
State Fixed Effects FE FE FE FE FE
R-squared 0.932 0.905 0.876 0.938 0.883
n 53 53 53 53 53
Two-sided t-tests with robust standard errors: *** 99% significance level; ** 95% significance level;  *90% significance level
Table 5:  State Level Lobby Expenditure by Group Category
Dependent Variable:  Log of Total Per Capita Lobbying Expenditures for each grouping for each state for each year
Note:  Nine states are included in the analysis; state fixed effects (FE) are used in all models. 
Budgetary and Regulatory Primarily Regulatory
Agriculture Banking
Construction Civil Rights
Education Communications
Environment Energy
Health Gambling*
Indians Good Government
Pharma* Guns
Police and Fire Hotel
Transportation Insurance
Welfare Law
Manufacturing
Real Estate*
Religion
Resources
Services
Small Business
Smokes*
Spirits*
Sports
Utilities
Women
* indicates also a "hidden" issue (see text for full explanation)
TABLE 6: Classification of Issue Areas
Variable Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Budget and Regulatory 
Issues Primarily Regulatory Issues Hidden Groups
Budget Year 0.331** 0.409*** 0.386
(0.149) (0.110) (0.265)
Regular Session 0.325 0.421 0.055
(0.391) (0.258) (0.521)
Special Session 0.145 0.154** 0.037
(0.103) (0.069) (0.135)
Election Year -0.683* -0.301 -0.086
(0.377) (0.224) (0.379)
Size of House Majority -0.409 -0.714 -2.578
(1.218) (0.963) (2.350)
Size of Senate Majority -1.483 0.104 -1.199
(1.084) (0.874) (1.568)
Unified Government 0.382*** 0.265*** 0.161
(0.147) (0.089) (0.196)
Democratic Unified -0.398 -0.350** -0.524
(0.252) (0.165) (0.337)
Ln(Per Capita Income) 6.637* 0.570 4.572
(3.767) (2.714) (6.182)
Year -60.883** -1.692 14.654
(28.655) (21.012) (44.034)
Year2 0.015** 0.001 -0.004
(0.007) (0.005) (0.011)
Session Year * Election Year 0.749* 0.383 0.173
(0.434) (0.273) (0.522)
Constant 60,789.12** 1,616.30 -14,700.10
(28,622.71) (20,981.02) (43,984.64)
State or Issue Fixed Effects State and Issue FE State and Issue FE State and Issue FE
R-squared 0.74 0.80 0.63
n 528 1074 261
Two-sided t-tests with robust standard errors: *** 99% significance level; ** 95% significance level;  *90% significance level
Table 7:  State Level Lobby Expenditure by Issue Area
Dependent Variable:  Log of Total Per Capita Lobbying Expenditures for each issue area for each state for each year
Note:  Nine states are included in the analysis; state fixed effects (FE) and issue area fixed effects (FE) are used in all models. 
Ln(State Lobby Exp Per Capita) Equal to the Log of Annual Per Capita State Aggregate Lobbying Expenditures (Ethics Commission of Each 
State where data is available; includes 33 states.  Most data is obtain from official disclosures provided.)
Categories Categorization of each interest group into each of five categories:  corporate, trade association, membership organization, union, and government; for each state for each year.  (Ethics Commission of Each State where 
data is available; includes 9 states.  Most data is obtain from official disclosures provided. N > 35,000)
Issue Areas
Categorization of each interest group into 24 issue areas as defined by Wolak et al (2004).  We create eight 
additional categories which more finely define the issues.  For interest groups with missing data, we conduct a 
web search to determine to which category the group belongs.  (Ethics Commission of Each State where data is 
available; includes 9 states.  Most data is obtain from official disclosures provided. N > 35,000.  Professor David 
Lowery provided the categorization data from this website; used in Wolak et al (2004))
Budget Year Equal to 1 if the state budget is legally mandated to be created in the year; 0 otherwise. (National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL))
Budget Amount Equal to Log of the Per Capita amount of budget in years that Budget Year = 1; Equal to 10% of budget in years 
that Budget Year = 0.  See Footnote 9 for a precise definition. (Statistical Abstract of the United States)
Regular Session Equal to 1 if the legislature is in regular session that year; = 0 otherwise. (NCSL)
Special Session Equal to 1 if the legislature meets in special session in that year; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States and NCSL)
Long (Short) Session Equal to 1 if the legislature meets in long (short) session in that year; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States and NCSL)
Election Year Equal to 1 if the legislature holds regularly scheduled election in that year; = 0 otherwise (NCSL)
Budget Caps Equal to 1 if the state has budget caps; = 0 otherwise (Professor David Primo, data used in Primo, 2003)
Term Limits
Equal to 1 if the state has legislative term limits; = 0 otherwise (Professor Jeff Milyo, data used in Primo and 
Milyo 2004)
Professional Staff Equal to 1 if the legislators in the state have full time professional committee staff; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Senate (House) Size The number of seats in the state senate (house) (ICPSR and updated by Book of the States)
Veto Override The percentage of legislators that must vote for an override of the governor's veto in a given state (Book of the States)
Admin Review Std Equal to 1 if the a statute must be passed to override a regulatory agency in a state; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Unified Government Equal to 1 if the House, Senate and Governorship is held by the same party in a state; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Democratic Unified Equal to 1 when the Unified Government variable = 1 AND the it is a Democratic Party unification; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Ln(Per Capita Income) Log of Per Capita Personal Income of the State in a given year (Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce (BEA))
Ln(Population) Log of Population of the State (Census and BEA)
Year Year
Expansion Equal to 1 if the lobbying disclosure law in the state in a given year includes gifts to legislators, non-campaign 
contributions to legislators, or broad definitions of legislative influence; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Refinement Equal to 1 if the lobbying disclosure law in the state in a give year includes disclosure of source of funds, source 
of compensation, or categorization of lobbying activities; = 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
APPENDIX:  Variable Definitions and Sources
